

# An equity analyst perspective on capacity markets in NZ

Discussion document for MDAG meeting 21 April 2020

## **Summary**

## One analyst's perspective on proposals to introduce capacity mechanisms

- Resumption of renewables growth expected fall in average prices seems likely, new builds likely to achieve GWAPs >= LCOE.
   Decline of thermal baseload set to continue.
- Electricity market appears to be operating well, energy-only market arrangements still seem sufficient.


  (although UTS claim decision will be interesting). More depth and cap-type instruments on the forward market will always desirable, remains a work-in-progress. Using vanilla non-gamed SRMC offers, our hydro-thermal model suggests low-use thermal reserves remain economic even after a large renewable build programme.
- Toying with capacity markets or strategic reserve? Questions being asked by politicians and some in the industry whether existing energy-only market arrangements might be unfit for a renewable future, on the basis there may be insufficient incentive to build/retain capacity for security of supply.
- Careful with choices made in other jurisdictions. Unlike offshore markets, NZ prices are heavily influenced by water values. Shortage pricing and high cost backup are factored into daily spot prices via water values, which respond dynamically to moving forecasts of market-wide grid, fuel and generation capacities. Also unlike many overseas markets, peaking/storage plant in NZ can earn revenue streams from both traditional peak demand plus hydro-firming roles.
- Hydro-thermal modelling is required to inform the right decision. ICCC's detailed work is the only modelling we've seen that
  might address these concerns in an NZ context. But it is set 15 years in the future, warranting caution for such a long-dated window. Our H-T model
  can only make a rough pass over these questions (reserves, grid and hydrology are incorporated, but wind regulation and strategic reserve operating
  rules aren't).
- Key concern is that a shift to managed capacity targets and/or strategic reserve could undermine generation investment signals. We perceive a high risk for sector economics if capacity market or strategic reserve mechanisms are introduced: our modelling indicates NZ's hydro-thermal market outcomes would be sensitive to risk-averse capacity decisions. Our biggest fears would be 1) displacement of private capacity investment outside the managed scheme (encouraging new demand response and using growing flexibility at Huntly Unit 5 seem important) 2) over-procurement of capacity diluting build incentives for new renewables, and 3) efficient operation of hydro storage may mean greater use of lake storage ranges in the presence of a strategic reserve, and so activate the reserve more often than might have been intended.
- Consider a simple market traded product first? Before leaping into a capacity management program which could stall market-based
  decision making, we suggest looking into a simple cap product to capture key properties of swaptions, which might be usefully traded in the forward
  market.

# Resumption of renewables growth expected


### Broadly inline with possible company intentions, but isn't an optimised expansion plan

- Assumes 0.75%pa demand growth forecast
- Fall in average prices seems likely, but new builds still achieve GWAPs >= LCOE

#### OTA forecast prices distribution across inflows (\$/MWh)




#### Jarden base case assumed build profile



## Decline of thermal baseload set to continue

## New renewables and reduced ToP gas obligations should reduce baseload offers from Huntly Unit 5

- TCC thermal retirement expected by 2023
- Nova 100MW Junction Rd peaker now completed, are more at Otorohonga likely?



## Flexible thermal still looks economic


#### Model suggests plant can recover sufficient \$/MWpa to recover fixed O&M + capex

- Huntly Rankines may need ~\$62k/MWpa to recover ~\$30mnpa totex (contrast with \$120k/MWpa swaption revenue to 2022) over and above SRMC on coal ~\$97/MWh (~\$5.70/GJ, \$35/tCO2 & 11,000HHV), or above SRMC on gas ~\$118/MWh (~\$7.50/GJ, \$35/tCO2 & 10,500HHV)
- Junction Road may need ~\$105k/MWpa (= ~\$80k/MWpa to recover ~\$1mn/MW construction cost @7%, 30 years plus ~\$25k/MWpa for \$2.5mnpa O&M) over and above SRMC ~\$89/MWh (~\$7.50/GJ, \$35/tCO2 & 9,600HHV)
- Model only dispatches plant when spot prices are >=SRMC (no gaming assumed). Our base case model output
  indicates net excess revenues broadly inline with the annual recovery amounts above.
- We'd like to see simplified traded contracts that can mimic these payoffs. Table below shows annual payoffs from a modelled 1MW weekly cap contract (i.e. contract pays greater of \$0, or 168MWh x [weekly TWAP minus strike])

#### Modelled payoffs for a hypothetical 1MW weekly cap

Payoffs to 1MW OTA weekly cap contract				
	\$100/MWh cap	\$125/MWh cap		
FY21	\$245k/MWpa	\$165k/MWpa		
FY22	\$191k/MWpa	\$121k/MWpa		
FY23	\$118k/MWpa	\$70k/MWpa		
FY24	\$65k/MWpa	\$30k/MWpa		
FY25	\$63k/MWpa	\$28k/MWpa		
FY26	\$55k/MWpa	\$25k/MWpa		
FY27	\$60k/MWpa	\$24k/MWpa		
FY28	\$79k/MWpa	\$33k/MWpa		

#### Modelled payoffs for a hypothetical 1MW weekly cap




Source: Jarden estimates

# Capacity market conservatism could upturn price signals


- Mean annual payoffs from weekly cap products are a useful way of illustrating the sensitivity to the amount of flexible capacity available to the market, and shown below (re-running the hydro-thermal model assuming a +/-25% or ~250MW sensitivity to OCGT & Rankine available capacity)
- Modest increases in available reserve readily translate into much lower cap revenue. So risk-averse procurement of
  excess capacity would likely to crowd out merchant investment, whereas insufficient reserve procurement seems to
  readily produce price signals

Payoffs to 1MW OTA weekly \$100/MWh cap contract (\$000s/MWpa)				
	+25% OCGT+Rankines	Base case	-25% OCGT+Rankines	
FY21	\$123k	\$245k	\$485k	
FY22	\$99k	\$191k	\$382k	
FY23	\$64k	\$118k	\$240k	
FY24	\$35k	\$65k	\$136k	
FY25	\$35k	\$63k	\$128k	
FY26	\$32k	\$55k	\$108k	
FY27	\$36k	\$60k	\$113k	
FY28	\$49k	\$79k	\$143k	



# Managed capacity targets would likely tend to risk-aversion?


Figure 3-2: Comparison of 2019 TPR prudent peak demand forecast with previous TPR forecasts



Source: Transpower Transmission Planning Report 2019

# Hydro storage use in the presence of strategic reserves

- We don't have mechanisms in the model to reflect an HRC-based dispatch of strategic reserve plant, but is similar to increasing reservoir storage and/or reducing VOLL when storage is empty
- Only indicative: running a much lowered VOLL when reservoir empty makes only a ~\$5/MWh impact on average electricity prices, but has a large impact on optimised lake operation – strategic reserve much more likely to be used



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