


Presentation to MDAG



Saves and Win-Backs

15th March 2018

"to promote competition in.... electricity industry for the long term benefit of consumers "

The <u>discretionary</u> offering of incentives in order to reverse switching comes at the expense of broad-based downward pressure on price.



- The post implementation review doesn't relitigate the fact a successful scheme's benefits will outweigh its costs.
 - Various submissions put the value available to consumers at as much as \$400m per annum if incumbent retailers were forced to offer their best rate to all consumers.
- The MDAG problem definition rightly focuses on the fact that the current scheme is ineffective, not the case for a scheme to exist.
- The benefits to consumers via stronger retail competition and a subsequent broader downward pressure on prices is clear.
- Electric Kiwi's focus is on how the scheme could be refined to more effectively deliver the EA's statutory purpose.



Effective regulation of Win-backs:

- Should weaken the incentives incumbent retailers have to only offer their best price to a customer when they decide to leave:
 - Win-backs should not be presented (nor any other communication except final bill) before a customer has received their first bill (or 45 days whichever is shorter)
 - One of the key failures of the scheme was the non existent moratorium period and the ease of unwinding the switch
- Should remove the opportunity for predatory win backs by incumbents that target independent retailers more often than other incumbents and weaken competition.
 - Evidence that Independent retailers are over-represented in win backs.
 - Cynical in the extreme that incumbents were suddenly able to accelerate switching time frames to circumvent the initial scheme any modifications to the scheme should assume the most cynical interpretation by incumbents.
- Should be mandatory and enforced.



If this is too complex, ban win-backs as other jurisdictions and industries have done.